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We need human rights not nationalism ‘lite’
Globalization and British solidarity
MIKE O’DONNELL
University of Westminster, UK
ABSTRACT The article explores the relationship of multiculturalism to social
solidarity. The multicultural nature of Britain is accepted as a welcome reality but
certain problems in relation to the development of multiculturalism in Britain are
acknowledged. Various approaches to buttress or replace multiculturalism are
reviewed. These are: a strengthened and/or reconstituted nationalism (‘British-
ness’); human rights; and social equality. The issue of citizenship recurs throughout.
It is argued that a combined emphasis on human rights and greater social equality
offer a better basis than nationalism for strengthening solidarity in Britain, especi-
ally in the longer term. Sociological theory offers a fruitful if strangely neglected
starting point for understanding social solidarity. I draw critically on Durkheim and
Marx to obtain some objective perspective on this controversial matter.
KEY WORDS Britain ● citizenship ● equality ● integration ● multiculturalism ●
social solidarity
INTRODUCTION
The intensification of the debate about British identity reflects fears that
British society is becoming more fragmented along ethnic and religious
lines, with possible consequences of disorder and dysfunction. These fears
have increased since the London bombings of July 2005 (7/7) and the
alleged conspiracy of August 2006 to blow up 10 planes: the former provid-
ing Britain’s parallel to the USA’s iconic September 11, 2001 (9/11). Terrorism
is the perceived immediate threat but some see multicultural policy as an
underlying factor eroding a sense of national unity. Trevor Phillips, a
prominent left-wing social commentator and the Chair of the Commission
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for Racial Equality, gave several influential speeches to this effect follow-
ing 7/7 (2005a, 2005b). A tendency for ethnic and religious identities to
overlap in Britain has sharpened the lines of possible conflict.
Responses to the alleged crisis of multiculturalism in Britain include:
advocacy of a strengthened nationalism; unity through shared citizenship;
reassertion of some form of multiculturalism; and greater emphasis on
human rights as a broad basis of identification for the citizens of a diverse
society. These ‘solutions’ are not mutually exclusive and often the debate is
about how best to balance all or some of these factors. Thus David
Goodhart combines an emphasis on nationalism with citizenship and is
critical of both multicultural and human rights as bases of social cohesion
(2004a, 2004b, 2006). Despite the complexity of some contributions, the
debate has tended to become polarized around the respective claims of
multiculturalism and a revitalized British identity. At one extreme, some see
multiculturalism as the source of many of Britain’s current discontents,
whilst others condemn any notion of ‘Britishness’ as reactionary and im-
perialistic.1 There are more productive ways of framing the debate than this.
The underlying issue is social solidarity and how to foster it. Focusing on
national identity as a counterbalance to multiculturalism is merely one
approach and could be counterproductive if pursued insensitively.
Below I review the relationship of multiculturalism to the following:
‘Britishness’; human rights; and social equality. Citizens’ rights recur as an
issue throughout. Equality is a theme of both citizens’ and human rights but
also has a distinct provenance via the socialist/social democratic tradition.
My argument is that a combination of human rights and social equality offer
a better basis than nationalism for strengthening social solidarity in Britain,
especially in the longer term. These universal perspectives also offer a
better basis than nationalism for a critique of multiculturalism. Sociological
theory offers a fruitful starting point for understanding social solidarity and
I draw critically on Durkheim and Marx to gain some objective perspective
on this fraught matter.
The controversial nature of this issue requires that I clarify my own
perspective. First, it is clear that Britain is a multicultural society and in any
conceivable scenario is likely to remain one. To reverse this would require
policies little short of fascism. Second, it follows that even if multicultural-
ism has in some ways ‘gone wrong’, it cannot be abolished but should be
reshaped through policy and/or informal social interaction. The policy shift
(back) towards integration advocated by Trevor Phillips cannot fundamen-
tally change the fact that Britain is a multicultural society, though it may
encourage exploration of areas of cultural commonality. Third, my own
commitment is to a multicultural rather than a monocultural Britain. I see
this as complementary to human rights and greater social equality.
The case made below that human rights are a particularly powerful means
of contributing to social solidarity in a diverse society is predominantly
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theoretical but practical and empirical arguments are also cited. Not that
theory per se needs defending, but some critics of the human rights project,
particularly nationalists, sometimes characterize its supporters as impracti-
cal romantics and themselves as realists. Thus, Skrbis, Kendall and
Woodward mock the ‘impotence’ of Beck’s (2006[2004]) cosmopolitan
vision in which universal human rights prominently figure (Skrbis et al.,
2004: 118). In fact, attempts to extrapolate the pattern of the future from
the present have a distinguished pedigree in social science. Beck’s work on
global risks and the necessary collective response is firmly within this
tradition – and is highly realistic (2006[2004]).
Several points of terminology need to be made. The debate under
discussion is about ‘Britishness’ rather than ‘Englishness’ and accordingly I
use the former term. Britishness is an example of nationalism but there is
a problem of appropriate usage of the latter term. Nationalism is a broad-
spectrum ideology ranging from fascism to a moderate identification with
a given country with no necessary negative assumptions about other
nations. These variations are indicated below as necessary. I use the term
‘solidarity’ rather than ‘integration’ as the appropriate term to indicate
social cohesion and order. Integrationist policies can contribute to soli-
darity but so can other policies and processes discussed below. Finally,
several of the many meanings of the term ‘equality’ are used. I adopt the
human rights assumption that human beings are equal in their humanity.
References are also made to socialist and liberal approaches to equality, the
former stressing greater material equality and equality of cultural access
and the latter greater equality of opportunity. I use the qualification
‘greater’ to indicate that, as far as I am concerned, there is no necessary
assumption of absolute equality in either ideological account of equality.
DURKHEIM AND MARX: SOCIAL SOLIDARIT Y
In The Division of Labour in Society, Durkheim stipulated two kinds of
social solidarity: mechanical and organic (Durkheim 1964[1893]). The
former is based on members’ unity of beliefs and values, often religious, and
the latter on practical interdependence resulting from the modern, complex
division of labour. While these concepts remain a useful starting point for
analysing social solidarity, the social context to which Durkheim applied
them has greatly changed and they require review and buttressing from
contemporary social science.
Adopting a broadly social evolutionary perspective, Durkheim assumed
that as modern socioeconomic forms came to predominate, the incidence
of mechanical solidarity would decline and organic solidarity would
increase. He argued that the values underpinning modern societies were
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rational and secular rather than religious. Until about 20 years ago, many
observers would have agreed with his following remark, but it now seems
spectacularly mistaken:
If there is one truth that history has settled beyond all question, it is that
religion embraces an ever diminishing part of social life. (Durkheim in
Thompson, 1985: 49)
In fact, the solidarity of many predominantly Islamic nations is substantially
based on a high degree of religious unity and is also arguably a significant
factor in that of some other societies, including the USA. Equally, religious
divisions within otherwise modern societies can undermine organic soli-
darity. This has been the case in Northern Ireland and arguably the growth
of religious diversity in the rest of Britain during the post-Second World
War period is divisive and may become more so.
Whereas mechanical solidarity has persisted beyond Durkheim’s expec-
tation, organic solidarity has proved more fragile than he perhaps expected
– although he did stipulate demanding conditions for its effective function-
ing (p. 265). Durkheim’s model of a modern society assumed largely
autonomous nation states within which economic activity was effectively
regulated by the state (the role of the state in maintaining a ‘normal’
division of labour is extensively discussed in Book Three of The Division of
Labour in Society). Globalization weakens this model by reducing the
degree to which the borders of modern nation states circumscribe relatively
discrete societies. Appadurai (1996) and Urry (2000, 2003) have illustrated
the extent to which global flows of information, images, objects and people
have opened up formerly relatively homogeneous and autonomous
societies to powerful and potentially disruptive external economic, social
and political forces.
Durkheim scarcely addressed the effects of the international economic
and political forces on organic solidarity. Indeed, as Ken Thompson points
out, he did not even think it worth speculating much about the possibility
of a politically unified Europe, let alone world government (2002: 154).
Specifically, he did not consider the effect on organic solidarity of the
relocation of substantial domestic production abroad and/or the use of
im/migrant labour. Globalization has greatly accelerated these develop-
ments, including their disruptive consequences. It is Marx rather than
Durkheim who offers foresight on these matters.
Marx analyses the division of labour in terms of capitalism rather than
modernity. He differs from Durkheim in regarding the capitalist division of
labour as fundamentally divisive and as generating a deep fault-line in capi-
talist society (Marx in Bottomore and Rubel, 1967: 153–8). Unlike
Durkheim, Marx analysed the international dimension of the division of
labour, arguing that capital adapts the division of labour to suit its own
purposes (mainly profit) with limited or no concern for the effect on social
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stability. He fully theorized the global or, as he put it, ‘imperialist’ dimen-
sion and momentum of capitalism (Marx in Bottomore and Rubel, 1967:
145–8). More recently, Lash and Urry (1987) use the phrase ‘disorganised
capitalism’ to describe the prevailing character of the ‘free’ market that
followed the more regulated version.
Durkheim emphasized the growth of individual diversity in modern
societies but made little reference to the consequences of increased ethnic
group diversity or to the possible associated allegiances of various ethnic
groups to external entities, including religious and political. Recently, ethnic
and cultural conflict has been more apparent than conflicts directly caused
by the mobility of capital and labour, but the latter have an underlying
influence on the former. Global or international labour has been so
weakened in relation to global capital that its protests have been subdued
and its arguments muted. However, as both Marx and Durkheim appreci-
ated, such class inequality is not a sound long-term basis for social solidarity.
Marx’s views in this respect require no elaboration. While Durkheim
accepted class hierarchy he was a radical meritocrat, arguing that organic
solidarity could not function ‘normally’ without genuine equality of oppor-
tunity (1964[1893]: 374–88). This led him to advocate a number of egali-
tarian positions, including opposition to inherited wealth (1957: 210–11).
Marx’s critique of nationalism as an ideology that divides the working
class has been extended by some contemporary Marxists and critics of the
left to apply to what they see as the ineffective and potentially divisive
effects of multiculturalism (Mullard, 1982; Solomos, 2003: 209–10). They
mainly focus on national and ethnic division among the proletariat,
although in principle such division can affect all classes. They argue that the
conflicts of capitalist society, including ethnic or racial ones, cannot be fully
or systemically understood or resolved at the cultural level, but require
addressing in terms of the political economy of capitalism, particularly its
tendency to produce extreme inequalities (see also Miles and Brown, 2003:
130–6, 148–50). Marxist theory offers a radical interpretation of racial and
ethnic conflict that locates nationalism and frequently multiculturalism as
exacerbating factors. To the extent that this perspective has merit, it is
questionable whether either nationalist or multicultural policies alone or in
combination can adequately solve ethnic conflict and cultural fragmenta-
tion.
To emphasize the role of economic factors in explaining Britain’s, and by
implication western Europe’s, current ethnic conflicts does not imply that
cultural factors are unimportant or without ‘relatively autonomous’ effect.
The Rushdie ‘affair’ emphatically demonstrated the contrary, as did the
worldwide protests in early 2006 against the cartoons of the Prophet.
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis is too narrowly cultural; never-
theless there is immense potential for conflict between the values and
practices of Islam and western liberalism (Huntington, 1996).
ETHNICITIES 7(2)252
253
In summary, whereas Durkheim regards the ‘modern division of labour’
as socially unifying (in its ‘normal’ form), Marx and Marxists see ‘the capi-
talist division of labour’ as fundamentally divisive. The systematic thinking
of these two classic thinkers can illuminate the multiculturalism/British
identity debate and similar debates across Europe. In particular, both
consider that solidarity requires greater equality than occurs in contempor-
ary capitalist societies.
MULTICULTURALISM AND SOCIAL SOLIDARIT Y
Criticisms of multiculturalism preceded 9/11 but have since become more
widespread. Prior to 9/11, the debate in North America and Britain largely
focused on the respective merits of multiculturalism/cultural relativism
versus human rights/universalism (see Barry, 2001; Kelly, 2002). After 9/11,
and in Britain particularly after 7/7, the emphasis of the debate shifted to
multiculturalism versus national identity. Some adopted compromise posi-
tions in these debates although the overall tone was quite partisan. The post
7/7 debate was initially conducted mainly through the daily and weekly
British media where contributions tended to be short and sharp.
Despite fundamental differences, both the human rights and nationalist
perspectives typically argue that strong multiculturalism threatens social
solidarity. There are two main aspects to this criticism. The first is that a
preoccupation with multiculturalism obscures and devalues what people
have in common. Human sameness is important as well as difference. In the
human rights’ perspective, the reference point for what people have in
common is the human species, whereas in the nationalist one the reference
point for inclusion is usually British citizenship, although some versions are
narrower, seeking to exclude one or more group as being less authentically
‘British’. The media debate in Britain focused on integration through a
revived national identity as the main antidote to ethnic tension and
perceived segregation without adequately considering alternative
approaches to strengthening social solidarity, including the human rights
one. This may partly be because Trevor Phillips, the influential Chair for the
Commission for Racial Equality, presented the terms of the debate in this
way (2005a).
A second criticism of multiculturalism is its alleged ‘political correct-
ness’. This criticism is associated with the political right (Browne, 2005) but
has also come from the left (Cummings, 2001). Political correctness is seen
as bureaucratic and controlling, if not repressive and, at least by implication,
as a threat to social solidarity. The minority rights reforms of the last 40
years have involved establishing a vast framework of law and regulations,
with accompanying enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. If these are
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to some extent necessary to reduce prejudice and discrimination – and
surely they are – they also run a risk of stifling legitimate opinion and
debate. Clearly a balance has to be struck. Where the balance weighs
against freedom of expression people may feel inhibited and even intimi-
dated, and resentment can build up. This association with political correct-
ness has contributed to the backlash against multiculturalism.
Several writers with Muslim cultural roots have expressed the need for
a more open cross-cultural dialogue with perhaps less inhibition than a non-
Muslim might choose to do. For instance, Hanif Kureishi argues that ‘an
effective multiculturalism’ should involve ‘a robust and committed
exchange of ideas’ rather than ‘a superficial exchange of festival and food’
(2005: 21). The relative lack of such debate until recently in Britain has
resulted in previously little discussed and even unrecognized issues erupting
dangerously. A crucial one is the extent to which the western liberal value
of freedom of expression should apply to religion. Manifestly, there are
other serious matters of cultural disagreement – not only between some
versions of Islam and western liberalism but between aspects of certain
African and African-Caribbean cultures and the West. There is a sense in
which Muslim anger has caused a loss of liberal ‘innocence’ in a way that
black anger never quite did. Well-meaning words and even reform are insuf-
ficient to assuage the sense of historic injustice and humiliation felt across
a proud culture. An honest debate is needed between cultures, including
their historical relations. As Kureishi concludes: ‘(our) children deserve
better than an education that comes from liberal guilt’ (2005: 21). What they
do deserve is a debate in which conflicting and complementary cultural
values are thoroughly aired in a mutually civilized and tolerant manner. If
this is now beginning in Britain following the shock of the alleged conspir-
acy of August 2006, it has taken far too long.
The effects of political correctness are not confined to the intellectual
sphere. The politically correct ethos surrounding multiculturalism can
undermine the informative and constructive communication required to
formulate practical policy and behaviour. Often difficult and controversial
matters affecting minority communities are ignored by white commentators
and left to minority writers to address. The latter include Diane Abbott
(‘black on black’ gun crime, 2005) and Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (black
racism, 2003).2 It is understandable that white commentators should feel
cautious about commenting on sensitive ‘race’ issues. However, in a mature
multicultural society in which trust is high, they would feel more confident
to do so. Michael Cummings passionately argues that social scientists
should in any case address these issues because avoidance can damage the
very people whose sensitivities are supposedly being protected. He
contends that political correctness on the left ‘unintentionally undermines
progressive causes’ (2001: ix). I argue later that it is not merely ‘progress-
ive causes’ but the wider ‘social equality project’ of the left – which
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transcends ethnic divisions – that has been damaged and, in fact, almost
supplanted by an excessive but paradoxically inhibited emphasis on
culture.
Bhikhu Parekh and Tariq Modood are among the academic contributors
to the multicultural debate who have defended multiculturalism against
recent criticism. Parekh’s Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000) and the
Report of the Commission he chaired, The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain
(the ‘Parekh Report’) (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain,
2000) are regarded by some critics as emphasizing minority rights at the
expense of national identity (Guardian, 2000) and by others at the expense
of human rights (Barry in Kelly, 2002: 212–17). I partly agree with the latter
criticism and will return to it later. Parekh makes a sustained attempt to
balance the merits of multiculturalism with those of national identity and
human rights. However, my reading of the Parekh Report is that its commu-
nitarianism – Britain as a ‘community of communities’ – was the acme of a
trend in multiculturalism that had simply gone too far and was already in
danger of losing support even before 9/11 (for a more favourable view of
the Parekh Report and one critical of the media’s response to it, see
Pilkington, 2003: 264–74). It is possible that the Report inadvertently set
back rather than helped the cause of multiculturalism but in any case, 9/11
has provoked much soul-searching about the possible divisive effects of
multiculturalism.
More recently, Tariq Modood, a notable but critical admirer of Parekh,
has reasserted the continuing need for a ‘moderate, egalitarian multi-
culturalism’, which he sees as complementary to developing a sense of
national belonging (2005a: 205). Modood argues that there is a need for
British Muslims to develop strong institutions, somewhat as British Jews
have done, which interweave with the fabric of British public life (2005b).
Clearly, there is a cultural dimension to this, but his main argument is that
Muslims should engage in political and civic pluralism. Few would disagree,
but such is now the degree of communal distrust that even what Modood
terms ‘political multiculturalism’ requires to be pursued rather less for
ethnic advantage and more to achieve consensus and conciliation. As
Dench, Gavron and Young argue, debate must effectively address the needs
of the ethnic majority as well as minorities for fairness and equality (Dench
et al., 2006, ‘Introduction’).
NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL SOLIDARIT Y
In the months following the London bombings of July 2005, numerous
politicians, journalists and academics prescribed one or other version of
shared ‘British identity’ as antidotes to ethnic and religious tensions and
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conflicts. Others were emphatic that the history of the British Empire
provides little basis for any such consensus (see note 1). I share this scepti-
cism on the grounds that Britain is now so culturally diverse that an
inclusive nationalism would be too dilute to provide a sufficient basis for
social solidarity. Britain is now so multicultural that it is necessary to widen
the basis of its solidarity. Human rights figured prominently in the post-7/7
debate in respect to the arrest and internment of alleged terrorists but not
as a basis for fostering social solidarity. Nor did the argument that greater
social equality could enhance solidarity get much media coverage.
David Goodhart’s promotion of ‘national citizenship’ has made an influ-
ential contribution to the debate on national solidarity (Observer, 8
February 2004; Prospect, 2004, 2006). Goodhart and certain other contrib-
utors to Prospect are concerned that Britain may have reached a point
where ‘diversity’ threatens solidarity (see also Wolfe and Klaussen, 2000).
Goodhart has recently stated his position more fully in a pamphlet titled
Progressive Nationalism: Citizenship and the Left (2006) in which he gave
space to others to comment on his views. His main argument is that ‘civic
nationalism’ expressed in the form of a strong welfare state offers a practi-
cal basis for strengthening social solidarity and that steps should be taken
to ensure that access to full citizenship, including welfare rights, is highly
prized as a basis of national identification. A key idea he floats is that of a
two-tier citizenship. He does not formally define the two tiers but gives the
example of temporary European workers as a group that might have
restricted rights. ‘National citizenship’ appears to equate with the privileged
tier of citizenship. Welfare is one of four areas where Goodhart believes
that public policy should ‘favour solidarity’; the others are: immigration and
asylum, culture, and politics and language.
There are important practical aspects of Goodhart’s argument that I
partly agree with. A strong welfare state is one of these, although, granted
that access to welfare requires some differentiation, a two-tier system is
probably not the best approach – it appears not to have worked very effec-
tively in Denmark and may have contributed to the recent ethnic-religious
tensions there. In any case, a robust welfare system should be part of a
broader egalitarianism, including an international dimension (see
Seabrook, 2002: 29). I also agree that immigration must be regulated,
although the preferred framework for dealing with issues of immigration
and asylum should be European rather than national. As far as asylum is
concerned, contrary to Goodhart’s wish to strengthen political control, the
role of the judiciary in protecting asylum seekers’ human rights is crucial
for justice and important for ethnic relations. Even these areas of partial
agreement with Goodhart indicate an underlying philosophical and politi-
cal disagreement. This is still more evident in terms of culture, politics and
language. ‘Nationalism’ is too narrow a core philosophy for multiethnic and
globalized Britain. On this point I agree with Parekh that ‘the language of
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nationalism is deeply flawed and best avoided’ (Parekh in Goodhart, 2006:
76). Much of the rest of this article argues or implies that nationalism is
inadequate as the main basis of social solidarity. Goodhart’s analysis seldom
extends much beyond the borders of Britain and as a result he misses the
‘big picture’. He betrays a conservatism at odds with his claim to ‘progres-
sivism’. An example of this is the conclusions he draws from a legitimate
distinction he makes between ‘indigenous’ British residents and more
recent immigrants and asylum seekers. He suggests that the former’s
historical struggle for democracy and its associated rights has fostered a
deep-rooted identity with the nation state, whereas recent immigrants may
covet and acquire citizens’ rights without having developed such an identifi-
cation. He further argues that competition for welfare with recent immi-
grants has caused some resentment among the ethnic majority. This analysis
is accurate as far as it goes but it requires sensitive balancing with the needs
and perspectives of ethnic minorities. Goodhart offers little more than a
rather minimal recognition that the identities of ethnic minorities must be
respected and an indication they must also be part of a revitalized nation-
alism. A deeper and more empathetic understanding of the motivations and
concerns of Britain’s minorities is urgently needed to achieve a sounder
basis of solidarity. This includes addressing human rights and British foreign
policy. The logic of human rights is to check the drift towards ethnic sepa-
ratism by ensuring common rights. The gradual harmonization of the rights
of European citizens moves in this direction.
A further example of Goodhart’s wary approach to diversity is his
tendency to treat diversity almost as the opposite of solidarity. This is not
quite correct and throws his discussion slightly out of focus. The opposite
of solidarity is lack of social cohesion and order. Diversity may threaten
cohesion and order, but not necessarily. It is impossible to pursue the point
in detail here, but arguably the diversity of the USA contributes more than
it detracts from solidarity. The USA is a famously argumentative and liti-
gious society, but, in the longer term, the democratic expression of diverse
opinion contributes more to the nation’s solidarity than would its suppres-
sion. However, the inept handling of diversity, particularly disregarding its
potentially divisive aspects, as has sometimes characterized British multi-
cultural policy, can lead to social disruption.
Goodhart’s suggestions are vulnerable to the Marxist critique of nation-
alism or, more precisely, ‘ethnicism’: that is, it divides the proletariat along
ethnic lines. From this perspective, nationalism and ethnicism are regarded
as kindred ideologies that obscure the common interests of the proletariat,
of whatever ethnicity, in greater equality. Instead, the indigenous prole-
tariat is offered an empty identification with ‘nation’ and im/migrant
labour is routinely characterized as the alien and threatening ‘other’. The
divisiveness of nationalism can extend beyond the proletariat. A ‘British’
and, still more, an ‘English’, nationalism is likely to have some appeal for
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British-born whites across the class structure and a relative lack of appeal
to ethnic minorities. Of course, divisiveness is the opposite of Goodhart’s
intentions, but the risk of it is inherent in his approach. Nevertheless, unlike
some multiculturalists, Goodhart does not fudge the real tensions between
Britain’s ethnic groups, despite his apparent prioritization of the ethnic
majority.
The route to solidarity in contemporary Britain is neither through
homogenized national identity nor hegemony of the majority. Britain is now
so diverse that no one set of national values, institutions and symbols can
provide a sufficiently unifying focus. The term ‘British’ itself is favoured as
a self-description by few Asians, although many accept it as part of a
hyphenated identity (Guardian/ICM Survey, 2002) and according to Tariq
Modood, over a quarter of British-born African-Caribbeans do not think of
themselves as British. (Modood, 2005a: 196–9). In any case, as Modood also
observes, ‘British’ is a declining identity even among white Britons (2005a:
196). Alternative means to sustain social solidarity must be found. It
matters less what people believe than that they care about the society they
live in. People are likely to care if their rights are secure and they have a
decent standard of living.
Nevertheless, within a wider strategy of rights and equality, there is scope
for government-led cultural initiatives to strengthen social solidarity.
However, these should be in the form of creating opportunity for fair and
open cultural expression, dialogue and exchange. One move in that direc-
tion would be for the representation of the Church of England in the House
of Lords to be replaced by a system better reflecting the diversity of faith
and belief in British society. And it would be a unifying and dignifying
measure if the people of Britain were formally recognized as sovereign
rather than as subjects of the monarch. However, much, almost certainly
most, cultural creativity in, for instance, sport, entertainment, and in some
areas of the media occurs with limited reference to government and should
be left to do so.
Finally, Goodhart’s views on the contribution of human rights to soli-
darity are substantially opposed to the arguments of the next section. He
criticizes multiculturalists for typically supporting human rights laws along-
side multiculturalism as a way of dealing with common needs and conflicts
(2004b: 33). It is true that Parekh and others tend to look as much to human
rights law as to national law for this purpose (see Commission on the Future
of Multi-Ethnic Britain, Ch. 7). However, Goodhart makes no mention of
the central and defining debate between multiculturalists and human rights
theorists referred to earlier. What is at stake in this debate is the balance
between universal/human values and law and relative/ethnically based
ones. The difference between the two approaches is not merely abstract, but
affects such everyday matters as dress and schooling. It is Parekh’s tendency
to favour relativist rather than universalist solutions in concrete instances
ETHNICITIES 7(2)258
259
that marks him as a robust multiculturalist. His theoretical contributions to
the multicultural/human rights debate further reinforce this assessment (see
especially his exchange with Barry in Kelly, 2002, Ch. 8). This debate rather
than Goodhart’s comments reflects the notably antagonistic nature of the
two positions. Of course, multiculturalists and human rights theorists
variously take something from each position, but crucially disagree about
the primary philosophical and legal (and therefore practical) basis of a free
society. However, Goodhart virtually conflates the two positions, too easily
dismissing human rights with multiculturalism. What he offers is a majority
nationalism. Ulrich Beck’s remark that those who fail to appreciate the
reality of globalization tend to reiterate ineffectual ‘modern’ (‘first
modernity’) solutions to ‘second modernity’ problems seems applicable
(2006[2004]: 68–71)). It is, then, possible to appreciate Goodhart’s concern
about multiculturalism whilst radically disagreeing with his views on human
rights.
Many of Goodhart’s arguments have been made by David Miller in his
impressive On Nationality (1995). If anything, Miller is more comprehen-
sive in his support of nationalism in that Goodhart favours a specific form,
‘progressive’ nationalism. Both rebuke cosmopolitan liberals for a
supposed lack of realism and Goodhart adds the observation that the
‘notion’ of human rights is ‘ahistorical’ (2006: 6). This need not be the case,
but the notion of nationalism is certainly not ahistorical. It has already
changed much more fundamentally and with profounder consequences
than Miller and Goodhart acknowledge. The identities of the British are less
and less confined within national boundaries. Communities of identity, for
some far stronger than national identity, straddle the world, a reality that
the British government must accommodate to.
Much of the debate reviewed in this article focuses on the relative claims
of three different bases of community as foci of identity: ethnicity; national-
ity; and humanity/human rights. Of course, all three are valid sources of
identity, but none is static or transhistorical. It is entirely realistic, in fact
urgent, to respond to rapid global change by bolstering human community.
Nationalism and ethnic identification not infrequently occur in excess and
can be counterproductive and even dangerous to the wider human
community.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL SOLIDARIT Y
I now turn to the positive side of my argument: that human rights and
greater social equality are the most effective means to develop solidarity in
a globalized society. In a sense, these two arguments are one in that rights
covering basic equality, including material survival and education, are
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written into the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (see especi-
ally Articles 9, 22 and 25). However, more than basic equality would be
required in modern societies to substantially enhance social solidarity.
A brief reference to the philosophical debate about the basis of human
rights will suffice here. Arguments range from the belief that human rights
are divinely ordained to the view that they simply offer the best protection
to human frailty (Turner and Rojek, 2001, Ch. 7). The latter point is
powerful, although human rights can also be conceived of positively as a
framework for individual, group and species expression and development.
However, the issue here is the potential of human rights as a foundation for
social solidarity rather than their philosophical justification. In this respect,
they are a frequent basis of legal appeal in cases where one ethnic group or
certain members of it are considered to be oppressing another. Ultimately,
the effectiveness of human rights depends on the support of a democratic
global consensus and commitment to action. In contrast to nationalism,
human rights offer the possibility of a universalist justification for action.
Participating more fully within a regional and global human rights frame-
work could alleviate fractiousness and fragmentation in Britain by increas-
ing a sense of fairness and justice. An appropriately framed British Bill of
Rights would complement nicely the Human Rights Act of 1998.
If globalization has disruptive and divisive effects, it also offers, through
human rights, solutions to the problems it produces. Mary Kaldor makes a
link between globalization, civil society and human rights. She argues that
‘civil society has become transnational’ (2003: 48) and that ‘reason, moral
sentiment and/or civil action . . . provide the basis for social solidarity’
(2003: 46–7). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its many
derivatives provide a more inclusive foundation for developing social soli-
darity than minority or majority cultures with limited reference to a wider
framework of values and law. Minority exceptionalism risks fragmentation
and majority hegemony risks degenerating into an oppressive nationalism.
In contrast, human rights, at least in principle, embrace everybody equally
and are therefore the natural (human) basis for social solidarity.
However, human rights and group rights need not be antagonistic and,
in fact, the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights
includes various rights that imply freedom to various group and communal
memberships, including political and religious. The diverse global origins of
Britain’s recent immigrant groups mean that human rights are of special
relevance to them. Their foci of identification are in part different from
longer-term inhabitants. If Britain and other western states are to maintain
the commitment of their minorities, they must respect the human rights of
all members of the wider ethnic and/or religious communities with which
their minorities identify – wherever and whoever they are. This includes
asylum seekers, those seeking to avoid deportation and those accused of
terrorist crimes. Otherwise, some members of ethnic minorities, possibly
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many, may distance themselves from and even reject the societies to which
they have emigrated. Clearly, some young Muslims of both Asian and
African descent in Britain have already done so. Many recent immigrants
into Britain are highly transnational in their identities, which is why the
Thatcherite Conservative politician Norman Tebbitt’s nationality test
(which cricket team would they support) remains as anachronistic as ever.
They identify with aspects of their countries of origin, just as Britons moving
within the country retain regional allegiances. These diverse, multiple and
sometimes fluid identities make it unlikely that most members of minori-
ties will adopt the kind of traditional British nationalism that has in the past
contributed to a sense of ‘one nation’ and helped create a degree of
solidarity. A further profound consequence of multiethnicity is that it is
increasingly difficult and dangerous for a state to declare war against a
country with which its minorities have substantial ties. To do so is perhaps
a kind of civil war. The logic of global communities and of a nascent global
community undermines nationalism.
The impact of globalization on the sources and flows of power and
authority in the contemporary world affects solidarity. Benjamin Barber
argues that the break up of the European and Soviet empires has let loose
a myriad of ethnonational identity movements, often reinforced by religion
(Barber, 2003). This is happening on a global scale and, paradoxically,
globalization contributes to it. In some cases, notably in eastern Europe,
these movements have dismantled polyethnic states and established more
monoethnic new ones or revived old ones. Parallel to this and reinforced by
it, the global movement of labour has resulted in large numbers of immi-
grants, often from areas previously subjugated by the European empires,
settling in western Europe. In contrast to eastern Europe, the monoethnic
basis of western European nations has been weakened. Concentrations of
ethnic minorities have some resemblance to internal colonies even where
residents have full formal rights of citizenship.
A central domestic issue now facing several western European states is
how to reintegrate their populations. Tendencies to ethnic segregation must
be balanced by countervailing forces if integration is to be achieved and
social solidarity (re)established. Human rights are the most ethically
compelling of these forces – far more so than some fabricated version of
nationalism, the content of which people cannot anyway agree on.
However, it is important to strike a balance between universal rights and
group, specifically ethnic and religious, rights. The metaphor of the
pendulum is appropriate – whenever it swings further towards one or other
of human or group rights, the pull back towards the other can be antici-
pated. In Britain, group rights – a.k.a multiculturalism – have had a long
momentum but this may now be reversing.
Although Bhikhu Parekh is a noted advocate of a global dialogue on
rights, he seems as much concerned to argue the cultural relativism of
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human rights as the practical need for their implementation (Parekh, 2002).
His writings on Britain focus more on the advocacy of minority rights than
the development of a wider framework of unity. His notion of diversity
inclines to the communitarian: an equality of communities. Despite attempts
to balance the claims of minority rights, human rights and national identity
– the latter, especially more recently – his emphasis is on the former. Thus, in
an article opposing ‘dogma’ in higher education he gives more emphasis to
criticizing the Higher Education Minister’s insistence that universities
prevent terrorist influences on Muslim students than to the possible effects
of such influences (Parekh, 2006: 16). Tariq Modood has better appreciated
the dangers of cultural conflict between sections of minority communities
and western liberal values and lifestyle (1992) and accordingly argues the
need for a dynamic and interactive multiculturalism rather than one char-
acterized by defensiveness and introspection (2005b). Thus, multicultural-
ism could strengthen national solidarity. He is also more open than Parekh
to the influence of universal values, although contends that these require
mediation within different national contexts (2005a, Ch. 9).
The Human Rights Act (1998) links Britain to universal principles of
justice that provide a foundation for social solidarity in a diverse society.
The recently established Commission for Equality and Human Rights
presents a further shift in the direction of universality in that it is intended
to unite into a single institution the various bodies that currently protect
against specific forms of discrimination – race, gender and disability – and
add age and sexual orientation. The point is that any human being, not
merely members of specific minorities, is potentially vulnerable to any of
these forms of discrimination.
The inclusion of ‘Equality’ in the title of the Commission for Equality
and Human Rights offers some encouragement for those who consider
Britain too unequal a society. Marxism offers a penetrating systemic
critique of capitalist inequality as well as of nationalism but the refusal of
many Marxists to link the human rights and equality projects smacks of the
ideological rigidity of yesteryear. Unfortunately, the interpretation of
numerous writers of the left of the Enlightenment tradition of rights as
primarily liberal propaganda has significantly undermined the intellectual
credibility of the human rights movement (see, for instance, Wallerstein,
1991; Hall, 2000, 227–31). The ‘blame game’ is dangerous in the current
incendiary climate. The ‘wrongs’ of liberal societies and individuals must be
confronted, but they do not undermine the argument for human rights.
Historically, inhumanity between cultures has been routine: the human
capacity for evil – what Freud came to refer to as ‘the death instinct’ –
appears universal. Recognition of one’s own evil – actual or potential – is
likely to contribute more to progress than condemnation of the evil – real
or imagined – of others. Such modest insight may even be a precondition
for an effective global dialogue on human rights.
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Equality is as much a part of the human rights tradition as liberty and
solidarity. A rights-informed social democracy is the answer to outmoded
attempts to separate communist/socialist and liberal/social democratic
interpretations of equality. The point is to combine these traditions
effectively.
EQUALIT Y AND SOCIAL SOLIDARIT Y
The adoption of egalitarian policies could significantly contribute to the
strengthening of social solidarity in Britain and, for that matter, globally.
Before focusing on the socially stabilizing effects of equality it is helpful to
locate the concept within the development of the rights tradition. Equality
gains purchase through being part of a wider developing framework of
rights.
The practical pursuit of equality has occurred mainly within the context
of emerging nation states. T.H. Marshall’s account of the struggle for civil,
political and social rights in Britain demonstrates how rights have come to
be associated with national citizenship (Marshall, 1963; 1973). The focus of
equality has shifted in given periods with social equality, particularly
welfare, being the dominant emphasis for most of the 20th century. Not all
individuals and groups benefited equally from the attainment of these
rights, but Marshall discerns a progressive and cumulative pattern. More
recently, Bryan Turner has illustrated that national traditions and the legal
embodiment of rights vary considerably (Turner, 1990). While this is true,
the emergence of a global human rights perspective can underpin and may
even eventually supersede national citizens’ rights (see Soysal, 1994).
Human rights have an inherently universal dimension – despite enormous
and well-charted inconsistencies of practice. The justification for possession
of human rights is simply membership of the species or common humanity
rather than national citizenship. The universality of human rights was a
prominent theme during the Enlightenment (see Lynd, 1982, especially
Chapter 5 titled ‘My Country is the World’) and again, during and after the
Second World War, culminating in the United Nation’s Declaration of
Human Rights.
However, Bhikhu Parekh (2002) and Ash Amin (2004) rightly argue that
European (and western) liberalism should not be the sole basis for the
construction of global human rights. Human rights must be constructed and
possessed by the species not merely by members of a specific culture. Amin
observes that even before post-war immigration, Europe has long been
exposed to and influenced by non-European philosophical and religious
traditions. Moreover, the conditions are there for cultural exchange to
increase and for the fostering of a community of discussion (2004: 13–4).
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Despite the serious problems bedevilling the human rights project, they
are increasingly institutionalized at the international/global level for which
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights provides a broad
template and point of appeal. It appears that civil and political rights are
emerging more widely than social rights (although there is a strong Islamic
tradition of communal help and protection as distinct from state welfare).
The uneven development of social equality is partly related to the domi-
nance of neoliberal capitalism which, whatever its other characteristics
relative to the distribution of resources and opportunity, tends to increase
the gap between the very rich and the poor. As the protests of myriad
social movements claim, growing inequality is a potential threat to global
stability.
Referring to material inequality in Britain, particularly of wealth and
income, Jackson and Segal state: ‘Current levels of inequality are not only
unjust: they also undermine social solidarity’ (2004: 39). Social rights
embrace citizens of all ethnic groups: they are colour-blind. In Britain, a
significant improvement in the material conditions of poorer sections of
particularly the African-Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi and white
populations would achieve more for solidarity than further emphasis on
multiculturalism. Jackson and Segal cite comparative studies that ‘demon-
strate that more economically equal societies are also those that exhibit the
highest level of trust between their citizens’ (2004: 41). Both the civil
disorders in Britain involving black youth in the 1980s and Pakistani and
Bangladeshi youth in 2001 were at least partly caused by low wages, high
unemployment and an accompanying sense of disaffection (Cantle, 2001).
In this important respect, the causes and solutions to Britain’s disorders are
similar to those that occurred in France in 2005. Hopefully, it is not too late
to reclaim a significant minority of seriously disaffected British Muslim
youth through egalitarian reform. Of course, a general reduction of social
inequality would benefit far more white people than members of ethnic
minorities, although in relative terms the latter would benefit most.
However, the wider the benefits of egalitarian reform the more positive
should be the effect on social solidarity.
In a brave article titled ‘No One Asked Blackburn’s People What they
Wanted’, the veteran socialist thinker, Jeremy Seabrook, stresses the
importance of including disadvantaged white people in egalitarian reform
(Seabrook, 2002). He combines a robust antiracism with an understanding
of the insecurities of white working-class people in relation to immigration.
He observes that the white working-class did not formulate immigration
policy, but experienced its disruptive consequences more directly than the
middle class. Similarly, Dench et al. (2006) contend that resentment at
immigration among some white working-class people in London’s East End




Seabrook advocates a major attack on poverty, not only in Britain, but
also in the poor countries in which many members of Britain’s minorities
have roots. The Marshall plan accomplished something on a similar scale in
post-war Europe and, given the political will, it could be done again. In
Britain, some resources could be directed to improving and extending
public facilities and places – those spaces we share together. Seabrook’s
suggestions seem more adequate to healing social and ethnic divisions
than Goodhart’s, which smack of what Beck might refer to as a first
modernity-type solution (i.e. nationalism) to a second modernity problem
(2006[2004]: 69).
It is worth reiterating that both Durkheim and Marx also considered that
greater equality would strengthen social solidarity. Although they differed
ideologically, both regarded inequality as socially disruptive. Whereas
Durkheim addressed the issue in terms of the reform of capitalist society,
Marx argued that long-term social stability and capitalism were incompat-
ible. Durkheim argued that the division of labour contributed optimally to
social solidarity only when equal opportunity existed. He considered that
this was far from the case in his own time, with the result that feelings of
anomie in relation to industrial work were rife (Durkheim, 1964[1893]:
353–73). He appreciated that to achieve equality of opportunity would
involve substantial state intervention. His concept of anomie resonates with
Marx’s analysis of alienation in the context of capitalist production. Marx
pitted the solidarity of the working class against capitalism and foresaw a
future of solidarity in a classless society. He advocated the abolition of the
capitalist division of labour, but never quite stipulated what equality in
communist society might involve. Whatever the respective merits of
Durkheim’s radical reformism and Marx’s communism, both understood
the substantial relationship between equality and solidarity and both in
their different ways were more radical than many contemporary commen-
tators, including many of the left.
There is no shortage of other areas of common concern in addition to
material equality. For, instance, the national school curriculum – which
some wanted to call the ‘common curriculum’ – should be widened to
include the international and British history of ethnic and religious minori-
ties. Faith schools should be required to set aside substantial quotas for
those of other beliefs and, in turn, these beliefs should be embedded in the
educational ethos and exchange of the schools. Areas of discussion between
communities that might lead to policy changes include marriage,‘the family’
and gender; drugs, including the international drug trade and the sale and
abuse of alcohol; and British foreign policy in the light of its reconstituted
population. These suggestions are made in the spirit of international
humanism but some or all may appeal to both multiculturalists and nation-




The conflicts and stresses associated with Britain’s multicultural society
have provoked a number of suggestions about how to increase integration
and strengthen social solidarity. This issue has been widely perceived as a
conflict between ‘British’ identity and the identities of ‘other cultures’
and/or religions. An almost reflex response has been to seek a revitalization
and strengthening of national symbols, values and bonds – i.e. of national
culture. As even many supporters of this approach acknowledge, the
difficulty is that there is widespread disagreement about what ‘Britishness’
is and what aspects, if any, should be generally identified with. Your ideal-
ized Britain may very well not be mine. It matters that Britons care about
their country, but the basis of caring need not be in a revived and perhaps
artificially gerrymandered nationalism. Given the cultural diversity of
Britain, shared material self-interest in the form of rights and greater
material equality is a sounder basis for social solidarity. Certainly, some
rights will be coded and secured nationally, but globalization means that the
principle of human rights transcends nationality and their implementation
overides national sovereignty. Many, though not all, rights are supported at
all of the ethnic communal, national and global level and in practice there
is often more practical agreement than theoretical argument might suggest.
However, the imperatives of historical change, particularly growing global
interdependence, and the need for a longer vision require the articulation
of these matters in the most inclusive and unifying terms.
Britain is not alone in facing the consequences of imperial expansion.
The former European colonial powers are all confronting a late post-
imperial crisis. What is needed is a post-imperial humanistic global vision
and matching action on a scale to convince the understandably sceptical. It
really does not matter whether this is termed radical, liberal, Marxist or, for
that matter Islamic. It needs to be agreed and it urgently needs to happen.
Notes
1 At the poles of opinion this debate can be quite uncompromising and emotive.
Thus, Gilles Kepel’s piece in the Independent, ‘Why Multiculturalism Has Failed
in Britain’, ran the subheading ‘Society has a choice between two models: Radical
secularism and radical multiculturalism’ and he left no doubt which he preferred
(Kepel, 2005). In contrast, Jonathan Steele’s article in the Guardian was as critical
of British national history as its title indicates: ‘The Textbook Whitewash of our
Brutal Empire is a Lie’ (Steele, 2006).
2 The following pieces make the point, although none was an explicit attack on
political correctness: Abbott, ‘It Hurts Me to Say It, but Guns Really Are a Black
Issue’ in the Evening Standard (2005); Alibhai-Brown, ‘Black Racism is Every
Bit as Bad as White Racism’ in the Independent, 03.02.2003. Later Alibhai-Brown
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gave a qualified but vigorous defence of political correctness in a notable spat
with the right-wing commentator, Anthony Browne.
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In defence of both multiculturalism and
progressive nationalism
A response to Mike O’Donnell
ANDREW PILKINGTON
University of Northampton, UK
Since 9/11, ‘to be a Muslim is to be under suspicion, under threat and,
given the huge increase in racial violence, under attack’ (Younge, 2001).
In Britain, the situation has worsened with the bombings of 7 July 2005
(7/7), the abortive bombings of 21 July 2005 and the alleged conspiracy of
August 2006 to blow up 10 planes. While the coordinated attacks in the
USA were deeply shocking, they took place in another country and could
be seen to be the product of fanatics. In 2005 and 2006, the conspiracies
were closer to home, with most of those responsible for the atrocities being
Muslims born and/or brought up in Britain. While the British government
and the media have continued to emphasize that the enemy is terrorism
and not Islam, there is little doubt that a discourse celebrating Britain’s
multicultural society is on the retreat (Rattansi, 2004) and in its stead
nationalist discourses from different sides of the political spectrum have
been revived (Goodhart, 2006; West, 2005), along with discourses that urge
Muslims to integrate (Modood, 2005). I write this at a time when, follow-
ing the leader of the House of Commons, politicians are vying with each
other in urging Muslim women not to wear the niqab veil. The clear
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